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I. INTRODUCTION: ANTICOMPETITIVE ZONING CHALLENGES 
The concept of zoning developed from the common law nuisance 
doctrine.1  The primary purpose of zoning is to organize communities so that 
compatible property uses are located in appropriate areas, thus limiting 
nuisances.2  Each municipality has a comprehensive plan which “does not 
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law.  
 1  BEVERLY J. POOLEY, PLANNING AND ZONING IN THE UNITED STATES, 40 (1961) 
(ebook). 
 2  Id. at 45 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386–87 (1926) (“[W]ith 
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regulate or control the particular use of property; instead, a comprehensive 
plan sets goals for the development or redevelopment of a community.”3  
Guided by such a plan, a municipality enacts a zoning ordinance that 
geographically divides the municipality into particular use districts (i.e. 
residential, commercial, industrial), with further limits within each district.4  
For example, one commercial use district may allow “retail stores, hotels, 
clinics, broadcasting studios, garages, and other similar uses,” while another 
commercial use district might allow for other types of businesses.5  In a 
municipality’s zoning ordinance, zones can also be drawn to restrict certain 
categories of businesses, such as heavy commercial or adult businesses, from 
specific locations.6  While an ordinance can regulate the types of businesses 
in each area, it should not regulate the individual businesses themselves.7  
For example, an ordinance can even prohibit a “big box retailer,” but it 
cannot individually prohibit Target or Wal-Mart.8 
Anticompetitive zoning challenges can arise in any industry where the 
potential addition of a local competitor poses a threat to the profitability of 
an existing business owner.  This practice is common, especially between 
supermarkets.9  For example, Supermarket A, or the developer of its future 
store, seeks approval from municipal boards and various permits in order to 
develop the new location.  Supermarket B, a nearby grocery store, has a 
financial interest in preventing Supermarket A’s project, or at least delaying 
the project for as long as possible. 
In some cases, a developer might discover explicit evidence that the 
 
the great increase and concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly 
are developing, which require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect 
of the use and occupation of private lands in urban communities. . . In a changing world, it is 
impossible that it should be otherwise.”)). 
 3  RONALD S. COPE, THE ZONING AND LAND USE HANDBOOK 5 (American Bar 
Association, 2016). 
 4  Id. at 17. 
 5  Id. at 18. 
 6  Id. at 6. 
 7  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 41 Cal. Rptr. 420, 423, 440 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(upholding City of Turlock’s Ordinance that “require[d] a [Conditional Use Permit] for the 
development of certain large-scale retail stores and would prohibit ‘discount superstores,’ 
which are defined as retail stores of greater than 100,000 square feet that devote more than 5 
percent of sales-floor area to nontaxable items such as groceries.”  However, the court did not 
find that “the Ordinance was enacted for the purpose of targeting Wal-Mart. The Ordinance 
[did] not single out Wal-Mart but, instead, prohibit[ed] all discount superstores within [the] 
City’s boundaries.”). 
 8  Id. at 440. 
 9  Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 175 (3d Cir. 
2015), cert. denied 136 S. Ct. 2451 (2016) (noting that supermarkets are an example of “an 
industry notorious for low profit margins, perhaps it is not surprising that this [case] is just 
the latest in a series of cases in which a supermarket allegedly employed anticompetitive 
tactics to keep a competitor out of the market.”). 
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challenger’s sole desire is to hamper a prospective competitor’s entry into 
the market.10  However, in such a case, it is more likely that the challenge 
would be disguised under otherwise legitimate complaints.11  There are two 
primary methods in which a challenger can oppose and delay a project: 
judicial challenges and administrative challenges.12  Both of these 
instruments can be used at many steps along a developer’s path to beginning 
its business.  Prior to building, developers need zoning variance approvals, 
which can be appealed through courts.13  The challengers may oppose the 
variance’s approval, for example, on the basis of traffic flow, parking issues, 
landscaping compliance, lighting, and infrastructure demands.  Developers 
may also need building permits, environmental approvals, and other 
approvals from local governing bodies, which may also be opposed through 
administrative challenges.14  Given the many instances where challengers 
can oppose a project, such challenges can accumulate to cause significant 
delay. 
An entity can sue to challenge a zoning approval, unless the challenge 
is brought solely to prevent a competing business from obtaining approval.15  
This is the sham exception to the general rule allowing parties to bring forth 
lawsuits.16  The sham exception allows the developer to counter-sue the 
challenger and potentially receive compensation for lost profits caused by 
delays in or dissolution of the development project due to the challenger’s 
baseless claims.17  Such spurious challenges brought by a competitor can 
impose significant costs on a prospective developer.18  Redevelopment 
projects are extensive and costly ventures that may require multiple 
appearances before the municipality’s zoning board for variance approvals.  
There are costly attorney’s fees for appearing at numerous hearings before 
the municipality’s zoning board and for responding to the petitioner’s appeal 
of a zoning approval.  Further, the developer may be required to create an 
extensive site plan, which is “a detailed depiction of the uses, buildings, 
 
 10  See, e.g., id. at 168 (noting that Challenger’s ecological consultant “praised itself for 
‘manag[ing] to delay the issuance of the [Wetlands] approvals based on a technicality’ and 
said that its substantive objections ‘may delay things a bit longer.’”). 
 11  See, e.g., Main St. Woolwich v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super. 135, 142 
(App. Div. 2017), cert. denied, 231 N.J. 335 (2017).   
 12  Gary Myers, Litigation as a Predatory Practice, 80 KY. L.J. 565, 593–94 (1992); see, 
e.g., Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 166–70.  
 13  Myers, supra note 12, at 593–94. 
 14  Id. 
 15  See generally, Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 
60 (1993); Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 182–83.  
 16  Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 60. 
 17  See generally Main St. Woolwich v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super. 135, 
152 (App. Div. 2017).  
 18  Id. 
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utilities, and infrastructure on a particular parcel of land.”19  The site plan 
includes all information necessary to explain elements of the project under 
review.20  To create the sophisticated site plan, a developer may need to 
engage numerous experts, including a planner, architect, engineer, and 
environmental expert.21  Challengers guided by an anticompetitive strategy 
frequently challenge every part of the development application process, 
including variance and permit approvals, in order to avoid the threat of 
outside competition.22 
Delays to the project can be expensive or even cause the development 
project to be terminated.23  Sites targeted for redevelopment may be vacant 
while the developer seeks approval.  Therefore, any delay to the project 
renders the developers unable to collect the rent necessary to offset its 
overhead costs.  This situation may be fatal if the developer is relying on rent 
income to make mortgage payments on the property.  Additionally, 
significant delays could be destructive to the developer’s project.  Since 
redevelopment projects are often sensitive to market conditions, delays could 
lead to the worsening of a project’s economic condition and make 
development no longer financially viable.24  The developer may also lose 
prospective tenants to nearby locations if the tenants are unwilling to wait 
several years before moving to the newly-developed site.25 
Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant26 deals with a prime example of 
sham litigation.  In Bermant, real estate developers seeking approval for a 
shopping center in Hamden, Connecticut claimed that the owners of two 
existing shopping centers conspired against the approval of their project.27  
In order to delay the approval, the challengers filed “fourteen (mostly 
baseless) lawsuits, multiple appeals from adverse decisions, [appeared] at 
zoning hearings, [and employed] litigation delaying tactics and [a] massive 
publicity campaign . . . .”28  Even if the challenger business-owners lost their 
petitions, they believed their challenges could delay the development of the 
competing property for a minimum of three to five years.29  One of the 
 
 19  Michael C. Spata, Decision-Makers and the Administrative Decisions, HOW TO 
LITIGATE A LAND USE CASE: STRATEGIES AND TRIAL TACTICS 55, 99 (Larry J. Smith ed., 
2000). 
 20  Id.  
 21  Id. at 60, 99. 
 22  See generally, Myers, supra note 12, at 593–94. 
 23  See, e.g., Main St. Woolwich v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super. 135, 152 
(App. Div. 2017). 
 24  Id. 
 25  Id.  
 26  664 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 27  Id. at 892. 
 28  Myers, supra note 12, at 594–95 (citing Bermant, 664 F.2d at 89 (2d Cir. 1981)).  
 29  Bermant, 664 F.2d at 892 (1981). 
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owners of the existing shopping centers conceded in a deposition that they 
“decided to oppose [the proposal] with every means, to either defeat or delay 
[it] for as many years as possible.”30  In Bermant, the Second Circuit held for 
the developer, reversing the District of Connecticut’s initial grant of 
summary judgment on the sham litigation claim.31  The Second Circuit ruled 
that these sham petitions were not protected by the First Amendment and 
remanded the case to the district court.32  While this case may seem like an 
obvious example of the sham exception, due to the evidence of intended 
baseless litigation during the deposition, these occurrences are hardly 
uncommon.33  While this type of anticompetitive strategy may at first be 
considered extreme, it shows how competitors can use “the courtroom as a 
sword to deter entry into a market.”34 
It is important for courts to recognize the sham exception in zoning 
challenges in order to protect developers from the costly effects of baseless 
zoning challenges.  However, courts should apply a more flexible standard 
when there is sufficient evidence to allege a pattern of baseless claims by the 
challenger. 
This note is organized as follows: Part I will discuss the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine and the sham litigation exception as it applies to zoning 
challenges.  Part II will review the factors that courts use to determine 
whether the sham litigation exception applies including an analysis of the 
Third Circuit Court’s decision in Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. 
Supermarkets, Inc, and the Superior Court of New Jersey’s recent decision 
in Main Street at Woolwich, LLC. v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc.35  Part III 
will discuss how courts should analyze these decisions and the importance 
of finding standing in these types of cases. Part IV will conclude. 
II. BACKGROUND: NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE AND SHAM LITIGATION 
EXCEPTION AS APPLIED TO ZONING CHALLENGES 
This section discusses the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which 
establishes the general right to bring a lawsuit in the antitrust context, and 
the reasoning behind its application.  The doctrine has an important 
application to zoning challenges, as the sham exception to the doctrine is 
used to combat baseless challenges that are brought to delay the real estate 
 
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. at 896–98.  
 32  Id. 
 33  Myers, supra, note 12, at 594–95. 
 34  Id. 
 35  Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 175 (3d Cir. 
2015) Main St. Woolwich v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super. 135, 142 (App. Div. 
2017). 
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development of a competitor. 
A. Anticompetitive Behavior is Not Permitted 
In general, any business can legally oppose a decision by the zoning 
board to grant a site plan approval or challenge the grant of a permit, unless 
the challenge is deemed to have no legitimate basis other than to deter the 
entry of a competitor into the market.36 
The First Amendment gives citizens broad rights “to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”37  The First Amendment protects 
the foundation of a representative democracy by giving its citizens the right 
to “communicate their desires, anticompetitively motivated or otherwise, to 
government officials.”38  However, judicial and administrative challenges 
are not protected by antitrust law when a party’s “efforts to influence 
government action are considered ‘sham.’”39 
Federal antitrust law is primarily established the Sherman Act.40  
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits any attempt “to monopolize any part 
of the trade or commerce.”41  The Clayton Act defines a party eligible to 
bring a suit as “any person who [is] injured in his business or property by 
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.”42  The broad language of 
the Clayton Act demonstrates Congress’s intent to “create a private 
enforcement mechanism that would deter violators and deprive them of the 
fruits of their illegal actions, and would provide ample compensation to the 
victims of antitrust violations.”43  In order for the plaintiff’s injury to satisfy 
the antitrust requirements of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, they must be a 
consumer or competitor in the restrained market.44  Additionally, the Acts 
are utilized by “those whose injuries are the means by which the defendants 
seek to achieve their anti-competitive ends.”45  In the zoning cases at issue, 
real estate developers are the entities that the defendants seek to harm in 
order to delay the future competitor-tenant. 
 
 36  See generally Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 
60 (1993); Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 182–83. 
 37  U.S. CONST. amend I. 
 38  Marina Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55 
RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 966 (2003). 
 39  Id at 966–67. 
 40  Id. at 966 n.3.  
 41  15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
 42  15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2018).  
 43  Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 171 (3d Cir. 
2015) (quoting Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982)). 
 44  Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 172 (quoting W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. 
UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 102 (3d. Cir. 2010)). 
 45  Id.  
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B. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine Provides Immunity from Antitrust 
Liability for Parties Who Petition the Government 
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine limits the Sherman Act’s reach by 
relying on First Amendment guarantees.46  The doctrine derives its name 
from two United States Supreme Court cases: Eastern Railroad Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.47 and United Mine Workers of 
America v. Pennington.48  Generally, the doctrine establishes that petitioners 
for government redress are immune from antitrust liability unless their action 
falls under the doctrine’s “sham exception” and deemed objectively 
baseless.49  Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, a lawsuit is considered 
objectively baseless “if no reasonable litigant could realistically expect 
success on the merits.”50  The doctrine provides immunity to petitioners for 
redress of their grievances to a variety of government bodies, including 
administrative agencies, legislatures, executives, or the judiciary.51  The 
doctrine has its foundations in antitrust law, but it has been extended to 
support challengers who object to zoning applications, since these challenges 
are petitions to government bodies recognized by the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine.52  “The Noerr-Pennington [d]octrine is not limited to federal 
antitrust actions . . . and may be invoked in other actions under state and 
federal law to protect the First Amendment right to petition the 
government.”53  It has also been applied to protect against “common-law 
torts such as malicious prosecution and abuse of process,” which are 
frequently the legal basis of claims brought in state courts by developers in 
response to the challenger’s objectively baseless opposition of their land 
development application.54 
However, in Noerr, the Supreme Court recognized that the application 
of the Sherman Act is justified in instances where the petition “is a mere 
 
 46  Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993).  
 47  E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
 48  United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
 49  Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 60. 
 50  Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Application of Noerr-Pennington Doctrine by State 
Courts, 94 A.L.R. 5th 455, §3 (2018) (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. Peirce, 974 F. Supp. 2d 927 
(N.D. W.Va. 2013)). 
 51  Id. at §2(a). 
 52  Main St. Woolwich v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super. 135, 144 (App. 
Div. 2017). 
 53  Wooster, supra note 50, at §3 (citing Arim v. General Motors Corp., 520 N.W.2d 695 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 54  Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super at 144  (suing for “malicious abuse of process, tortious 
interference with prospective business contracts, and civil conspiracy.”); see, e.g., Alfred 
Weissman Real Estate, Inc. v. Big V Supermarkets, Inc., 707 N.Y.S.2d 647 (App. Div. 2000) 
(suing for “(1) tortious interference with a contract, (2) tortious interference with prospective 
economic advantage . . . .”). 
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sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere 
directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”55  The sham 
exception exists to remove protections from meritless claims and ensures 
that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not give petitioners an unchecked 
right to challenge competitors.56 
C. Sham Litigation as an Exception to Noerr-Pennington 
The prototypical example of sham litigation “is the filing of frivolous 
objections to the license application of a competitor, with no expectation of 
achieving denial of the license but simply in order to impose expense and 
delay.”57  When the challenger brings a frivolous claim, the presumption of 
immunity under the doctrine is nullified, and the party can be held liable 
under the exception.58 
In the zoning approval context, “[o]bjectors to land use applications are 
immune from tort liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine unless ‘the 
conduct at issue “is a mere sham to cover . . . an attempt to interfere directly 
with the business relationships of a competitor.”‘“59  A challenger forfeits its 
First Amendment protections when the party’s zoning challenge lacks the 
genuine and legitimate purpose needed for a favorable decision.60  Courts 
first look at whether the challenger has made one or multiple filings.61  This 
is done to determine whether the challenge has a legitimate basis or whether 
it is a disguised attempt to directly interfere with the business practices of a 
competitor.62 
When courts decide whether a petition is a “sham,” a primary 
consideration is whether a pattern of baseless claims exists against the 
application for an individual development project.  In California Motor,63 
the Supreme Court discussed how a pattern of sham litigation abuses the 
judicial process.  Used this way, sham challenges could be effectively 
wielded to restrain competition.  While one claim may go unnoticed or 
receive leniency by a court, “a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may 
emerge which leads the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and 
 
 55  E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961). 
 56  See generally, Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 60–61. 
 57  Wooster, supra note 50, at §6 (citing Ex parte Simpson, 36 So. 3d 15 (Ala. 2009)). 
 58  Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993). 
 59  Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super. at 144 (citing Fraser v. Bovino, 721 A.2d 20 (N.J. App. 
Div. 1998) (quoting Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 60–61)). 
 60  Wooster, supra note 50, at §3 (citing Cordova v. Cline, 396 P.3d 159 (N.M. 2017)). 
 61  Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162,180 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
 62  Id. 
 63  Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).  
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judicial processes have been abused.”64  While it may be difficult to 
determine what actions qualify as baseless or how many of such actions 
constitute a pattern, once the court establishes that abuse of the judicial 
process has led to an illegal result, it should effectively bar petitioners from 
access to the courts and the municipal boards overseeing the zoning 
decision.65 
When the court determines that the challenges are objectively baseless 
and fall under the sham exception, a challenger’s First Amendment right to 
petition the government is no longer protected, since the party has sought to 
abuse that right for their own gain.66  Further, the Ninth Circuit held that, 
“[w]hen dealing with a series of lawsuits, the question is not whether any 
one of them has merit . . . but whether they are brought pursuant to a policy 
of starting legal proceedings without regard to the merits and for the purpose 
of injuring a market rival.”67  The challenger’s appeals need to be viewed as 
a whole, and one successful challenge does not support numerous baseless 
challenges.68 
In Hanover Realty, the Third Circuit detailed the distinction between 
the standards applied in California Motor and Professional Real Estate.69  
Even though these two tests provide similar explanations of the sham 
exception, they highlight that sham litigations should be analyzed differently 
depending on the number of sham petitions filed by the petitioner with regard 
to the subject property of the litigation.70 
D. Analysis When There is a Single Sham Petition 
When it is alleged that the defendant engaged in a single or limited 
number of sham petitions, the two-part test set forth in Professional Real 
Estate should be used to determine if the sham litigation exception applies.  
“First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no 
reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.”71  
Second, challenger’s claims must be brought as “‘an attempt to interfere 
 
 64  Id. 
 65  Id. 
 66  Id.; Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993). 
 67  USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa Cty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 31 F. 3d 
800, 811 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 68  Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 73 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that 
“[r]epetitive findings, some of which are successful and some unsuccessful, may support an 
inference that the process is being misused.”). 
 69  Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 179–80 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
 70  Id. at 179 (stating “[t]hree other Courts of Appeals have reconciled California Motor 
and Professional Real Estate by concluding that they apply in different situations: California 
Motors to a series of sham petitions and Professional Real Estate to a single sham petition.”). 
 71  Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 60. 
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directly with the business relationships of a competitor,’ through the ‘use of 
the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—as 
an anticompetitive weapon.’”72  This test should apply when there is 
evidence of sham litigation regarding a single suit or legal appeal by the 
challenging party.73  Part two of the test can otherwise be stated that the 
applicant is “subjectively motivated by bad faith.”74  Further, “[i]f an 
objective litigant could conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to 
elicit a favorable outcome, the suit is immunized under Noerr.”75  Only after 
the challenged litigation is determined to be objectively meritless will the 
court receive the litigant’s subjective motivation under the second prong.76  
Because there is only a single or limited number of challenges, the courts are 
less suspicious of the challenge than if there is evidence of numerous filings, 
which often indicates sham litigation.  Courts have reasoned that “with only 
one ‘data point’ it is difficult to determine with any precision whether the 
petition was anticompetitive.”77  It is also possible that courts have been 
unwilling to limit First Amendment protections on the basis of a single suit 
filed against a developer. 
E. Analysis When There is a Series of Sham Petitions 
The standard in California Motor should apply in cases where the 
defendant files numerous challenges or legal proceedings with regard to the 
prospective development project.78  There is no required number of petitions 
needed to apply the California Motor analysis rather than the Professional 
Real Estate test.79  The Supreme Court in California Motor held that a 
complaint sufficiently alleged a sham litigation when the aggrieved party 
established that the challengers “sought to bar their competitors from 
meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals and so to usurp that decision-
making process.”80  Additionally, the affected party alleged that the 
“petitioners instituted the proceedings and actions with or without probable 
cause, and regardless of the merits of the case.”81  The Ninth Circuit 
 
 72  Id. (quoting City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. 365, 380 
(1991); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127–144 
(1961)). 
 73  Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 179–80. 
 74  Wooster, supra note 50, at §3 (citing ACI Worldwide Corp. v. Baldwin Hackett & 
Meeks, Inc., 896 N.W. 2d 156 (Neb. 2017)). 
 75  Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 60. 
 76  Id. at 60–61. 
 77  Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 180. 
 78  Id. 
 79  Id. at 180–81. 
 80  Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512 (1972). 
 81  Id. 
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discussed that California Motor in USS-POSCO Industries, and “recognized 
that the filing of a whole series of lawsuits and other legal actions without 
regard to the merits has far more serious implications than filing a single 
action.”82  This standard triggers a holistic review weighing the facts of the 
case, in comparison to the two-part test in Professional Real Estate, where 
the court is less likely to scrutinize the single challenge.83 
When reviewing cases where a challenger has brought multiple 
lawsuits or attempts to delay the developer’s project, “the question is not 
whether any one of them has merit . . . but whether they are brought pursuant 
to a policy of starting legal proceedings without regard to the merits and for 
the purpose of injuring a market rival.”84  The review is prospective and 
considers whether the numerous filings were intended to harass the 
developer.85  In order to determine if the filings were without merit, the court 
must look at all the facts and circumstances of the case.86  The court “should 
perform a holistic review that may include looking at the defendant’s filing 
status (i.e., win-loss percentage) as circumstantial evidence of the 
defendant’s subjective motivations.”87  Included in these considerations 
should be evidence of bad faith, as well as the magnitude and nature of the 
harm caused by the challenger’s petitioning activity.88  The court must weigh 
the wins and losses for each side since the challenger may succeed on some 
proceedings simply as a matter of chance.89  In other words, “[t]he fact that 
there may be moments of merit within a series of lawsuits is not inconsistent 
with a campaign of sham litigation.”90 
The sham exception is considerably narrow.91  The exception 
frequently involves complicated questions of fact and places the burden of 
proof on the party “opposing [the] application of the Noerr-Pennington 
Doctrine to prove that the [challenger] comes within the sham exception.”92  
The analysis is further complicated by the fact that more is needed to prove 
sham litigation than anticompetitive intent.93 
 
 82  USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa Cty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 31 F. 3d 
800, 811 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 83  Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 180–81. 
 84  Id. at 180. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. at 180–81 
 88   Id. at 181. 
 89   Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 180. 
 90  Id. at 182 (quoting Waugh Chapel S., LLC v. United Food & Commercial Workers 
Union Local 27, 728 F.3d 354, 363–64 (4th Cir. 2013)). 
 91  Wooster, supra note 50, at §6 (citing United States v. Brown, F. Supp. 3d 697 (N.D. 
Ohio 2016)).  
 92   Wooster, supra note 50, at §6 (Brown, F. Supp. 3d 697). 
 93  Alfred Weissman Real Estate, Inc. v. Big V Supermarkets, Inc., 707 N.Y.S.2d 647, 
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III. APPLYING THE STANDARD IN RECENT DECISIONS 
Part II will discuss the Third Circuit’s analysis in Hanover 3201 Realty, 
LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc. and review how the Superior Court of New 
Jerseywithin the state court systemapplied the Third Circuit’s reasoning 
in Main St. at Woolwich, LLC v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc. 
A. Third Circuit’s Analysis in the Hanover Realty 
In Hanover Realty, a developer sought zoning approval to improve its 
property by constructing a commercial building that would become a 
Wegmans supermarket.94  The owner of a nearby ShopRite supermarket filed 
numerous administrative and legal challenges to the developer’s permit 
applications.95  In response, the developer sued the challenger, the ShopRite 
group, alleging violations of the Sherman Act and arguing that the 
petitioner’s filings were baseless attempts to keep out a potential market 
competitor.96 
Cases like Hanover Realty are complicated because the challenger’s 
actions impact the developer, who is not necessarily a direct competitor.  The 
challenger is typically a supermarket ownership group that owns numerous 
supermarkets, whereas the aggrieved party is a real estate developer.97  The 
prospective tenant at the newly developed location—in this case 
Wegmans—may not want to be involved in the sham litigation lawsuit.98  
Therefore, some anticompetitive claims do not survive the question of 
standing.99  In Hanover Realty, the Third Circuit held that Hanover Realty 
did not have standing to bring a “claim for the attempted monopolization of 
the market for rental space” because Hanover Realty itself does not compete 
 
652 (App. Div. 2000) (stating “[c]itizens who petition for governmental action favorable to 
them cannot be prosecuted under the antitrust laws, even though their petitions are motivated 
by anticompetitive intent.”). 
 94  Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 167; Company Overview, WEGMANS, 
https://www.wegmans.com/about-us/company-overview.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) 
(explaining that Wegmans is a supermarket chain based in the Northeast with ninety-eight 
locations in Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts). 
 95  Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 167; About Us, SHOPRITE, 
https://shop.shoprite.com/globaldata/banner-pages/about-us (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) 
(detailing that ShopRite is a cooperative with fifty members “who individually own and 
operate under the ShopRite banner.” The company has locations throughout the Northeast in 
Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut). 
 96  Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 164. 
 97  Id. at 167 (stating that the defendants owned twenty-six Shop Rites in New Jersey 
including one in Hanover about two miles from the site of the proposed Wegmans). 
 98  Id. 
 99  See, e.g., Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 187 (Ambro, J., dissenting in part) (citing 
Southaven Land Co. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1983); Serfecz v. Jewel 
Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1995)).  
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with ShopRite in that market.100  However, this did not eliminate the 
possibility that the developer could seek legal action against ShopRite for 
anticompetitive behavior altogether.  The court stated that “[t]he end goal of 
[ShopRite’s] alleged anticompetitive conduct was to injure Wegmans, a 
prospective competitor.”101  In order to indirectly keep Wegmans from 
operating a competing business just two miles from their ShopRite location, 
the challengers sought to impose costs on the developer of the property, and 
not directly on Wegmans.102  The challengers proceeded in this manner 
because the developer was the party who needed to obtain the appropriate 
approvals and permits before beginning construction of the new 
development.103  “[I]njuring Hanover Realty was the very means by which 
Defendants could get to Wegmans” and thus ShopRite tried to remove 
themselves from liability on a technicality.104  Therefore, “Hanover Realty 
can establish that its injury was ‘inextricably intertwined’ with Defendants’ 
anticompetitive conduct,” and thus they have standing to sue the 
defendants.105 
After realizing that Wegmans would be leasing commercial space at the 
proposed development site and entering their market, ShopRite filed 
numerous administrative and court challenges to Hanover Realty’s 
applications.106  This “petitioning campaign was designed to block Hanover 
Realty from obtaining the permits and approvals it needed to proceed with 
the project.”107 
The challengers disputed the Hanover Realty project in four major 
phases.108  First, they sought to vacate a Flood Hazard Area Permit already 
granted to Hanover Realty.109  However, their appeal was dismissed because 
their claims of “general property rights” and the new development causing 
“greater competition” were not sufficient to prove that the challengers were 
an aggrieved party.110  Second, the challengers hired an ecological consultant 
to submit a letter on their behalf, opposing the various wetlands permits 
granted by the New Jersey Environmental Department.111  The developer 
uncovered an email from the challenger’s ecological consulting firm, which 
 
 100  Id. at 167. 
 101  Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 174. 
 102  Id. 
 103  Id. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. at 166–67. 
 106  Id. at 166. 
 107  Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 167. 
 108  Id. at 166–70. 
 109  Id. 
 110  Id.  
 111  Id.  
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claimed it was proud of its ability to “delay the issuance of the Wetlands 
approvals based on a technicality,” and the fact that its additional objections 
may be able to further delay the project.112  Ultimately, the Environmental 
Department issued the Wetlands permit, but with several conditions, 
including one requiring the developers to survey the property for the 
presence of Indiana bats prior to construction, a condition with which the 
developers ultimately had to comply.113 
Third, the challengers submitted a letter to the Department of 
Transportation (“DOT”) objecting to Hanover Realty’s application for a 
street permit, which contained road improvement conditions in the 
development agreement.114  The DOT stated that Hanover Realty would need 
to perform additional improvements after it considered all relevant data and 
arguments submitted by third parties.115  The challengers’ final formal 
objection came in the form of an action brought before New Jersey State 
Court, which sought to nullify the Zoning Board’s site plan approval.116  The 
New Jersey State Court dismissed the challengers’ claim, both on the 
standing issue and the merits of the case.117  This objection was perhaps the 
most telling piece evidence establishing challengers’ bad faith. The 
challenger did not have any objections to Hanover Realty’s application to 
rezone the property for retail use until after the Zoning Board approved the 
site plan.118  After the zoning board approval, the challenger likely knew that 
a Wegmans’ supermarket would be occupying the new retail development, 
spurring him to lodge the challenge with the court. 
The time-sensitive nature of these approvals is shown by the fact that 
the development contract between Hanover Realty and their prospective 
tenant, Wegmans, included a provision that, in the event “Hanover Realty 
was unable to secure the required permits within two years of the agreement, 
Wegmans could walk away from the deal.”119 
The Third Circuit reconciled California Motor and Professional Real 
Estate “by concluding that they apply to different situations: California 
Motor [applies] to a series of sham petitions and Professional Real Estate 
 
 112  Id. at 168. 
 113  Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 168 (asserting that Hanover Realty conducted the Indiana 
bat survey and reported that no bats were found. Additionally, “Indiana bats may be found 
over a broad swath of the United States, including New Jersey. But true to name, half of this 
bat population does, in fact, hibernate in Indiana.”). 
 114  Id. at 169. 
 115  Id.  
 116  Id.  
 117  Id. at 170. 
 118  Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 169. 
 119  Id. at 167. 
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[applies] to a single sham petition.”120  Here, since the ShopRite group filed 
four challenges with numerous sub-challenges against the developer, the 
more holistic and scrutinized review under California Motor should apply.121  
Hanover Realty can establish that the ShopRite group filed a pattern of 
objectively baseless judicial and administrative challenges to the developer’s 
project.122  Even though the challenger succeeded on parts of their challenges 
before the Environmental Department and DOT, “the fact that there may be 
moments of merit within a series of lawsuits is not inconsistent with a 
campaign of sham litigation.”123  Further, the court looked at the subjective 
intent of the challengers and stated that they have not “articulated any 
genuine interest in flooding or traffic near the proposed Wegmans (which is 
two miles [away] from [the] ShopRite), or in protecting the Indiana bat.”124  
Therefore, there are sufficient facts to conclude that the ShopRite group may 
have engaged in a pattern of sham litigation and would thus not be entitled 
to protection under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.125  The court did not 
discuss potential damages, but Hanover’s brief to the district court listed its 
damages as “lost rent, increased expenses and carrying changes and 
diminution of value resulting from [ShopRite’s] sham petitioning.”126 
It is also important to address the dissent in this case, due to the 
difficulty of establishing standing in such cases.  The dissent believed that 
Hanover Realty was not the victim of an antitrust violation because the 
company does not compete in the supermarket business with ShopRite.127  
As the dissent noted, Hanover supplied commercial space to full-service 
supermarkets, however, the court ultimately ruled that it was the market for 
grocery stores, rather than the real property market, that was allegedly 
restrained.128 
B. Standard as Applied in Woolwich 
In Main Street at Woolwich, LLC. v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., a 
developer planned to improve its land in Woolwich Township by building a 
 
 120  Id. at 179. 
 121  Id. at 180. 
 122  Id. at 182–83. 
 123  Id. at 182 (quoting Waugh Chapel S. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union 
Local 27, 728 F.3d 354, 365 (4th Cir. 2013)). 
 124  Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 182. 
 125  Id. at 182–183. 
 126  Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. 
Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 179 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1327), 2014 U.S. Dist. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 1472, at *39. 
 127  Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 186 (Ambro, J., dissenting in part). 
 128  Id. 
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shopping center.129  In 2007, the developer, Woolwich, began the process of 
obtaining government approval to develop the site, which required the assent 
of the New Jersey State Planning Committee and numerous authorizations 
from the Woolwich Township Joint Land Use Board.130  In 2010, the 
Woolwich Township Joint Land Use Board (“Board”) approved the 
developer’s general development plan (“GDP”), which permitted the 
development of 1.5 million square feet of commercial and retail space in 
three phases.131  At the time the was GDP approved, it was unknown which 
stores would occupy the proposed development site.132  In April 2012, the 
developer submitted an application for site plan approval to develop phase 
one of the project, which included the building of a Wal-Mart.133  In October 
2013, the Board approved the developer’s final site plan, which went 
unopposed.134 
Following the Board’s approval of the site plan, an owner of a nearby 
ShopRite challenged the approval for “improper change of the phasing dates 
of the Complex, inadequate water and sewer resources, improper addition of 
acreage to the parcel, violations of the Municipal Land Use Law 
(“MLUL”) . . . inadequate proof to support the variances and waivers, [and] 
failure to comply with notice requirements.”135  However, the challengers 
lost these zoning petitions, and the developers filed a complaint against the 
challengers, alleging malicious abuse of process, tortious interference, and 
civil conspiracy.136  The developers claimed that the challengers’ filings 
amounted to sham litigation because they were filed with the sole intention 
of interfering with approval for a prospective competitor.137 
The New Jersey Superior Court held that there were sufficient facts 
alleged to find that Shop Rite “engaged in sham litigation for the sole 
purpose of impeding the development of plaintiffs’ shopping center and to 
stifle competition.”138  The court adopted the holding of Hanover Realty, 
concluding that “[t]he motion judge was required to consider the allegations 
in the plaintiff’s complaint that the [challengers’] action was part of a pattern 
of sham litigation brought by defendants for the purpose of injuring market 
 
 129  Main St. Woolwich v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super. 135, 142 (App. 
Div. 2017), cert. denied, 231 N.J. 335 (2017). 
 130  Id. at 141–42. 
 131  Id. 
 132  Id. at 142. 
 133  Id. at 142. 
 134  Id. 
 135  Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super at 142. 
 136  Id. at 140, 143. 
 137  Id. at 140. 
 138  Id. at 141. 
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rivals rather than to redress actual grievances.”139 
Under the California Motor standard, the court first reviewed the 
number of the challengers’ claims that were baseless and repetitive.140  The 
court did not find support for the challengers’ original appeals, raising 
concerns about the validity of the Woolwich GDP ordinance.141  Further, the 
court found the challengers’ appeal of the Board’s determination was 
without merit and their challenge to the water and sewer issues was “not 
supported by the MLUL or the case law.”142  Accordingly, the developer had 
successfully defended against litigation brought by the defendants.143  In 
addition to challenging the development project at issue, the developer 
alleged that between the challengers themselves and their associated entity, 
Wakefern, the parties had “engaged in an extensive course of conduct, 
including sham litigation, to interfere with the development of supermarkets 
that would compete with ShopRite stores.”144  The developer’s allegation 
included a list of seventeen sites in which they claim the challengers and 
Wakefern had attempted to interfere.145  The list contained challenges to 
projects across New Jersey for prospective sites for supermarkets like Wal-
Mart, Stop & Shop, Aldi, Kings, and Wegmans Supermarkets.146  The court 
included these challenges of other sites in their analysis, along with multiple 
petitions against the subject property.147 
As the court noted in Hanover Realty, a holistic review including all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the challenge should be 
performed.148  Therefore, in Woolwich, it may be relevant that there is 
specific evidence of anticompetitive behavior between the challengers and 
developer.  The court noted that, while the challengers’ appeal was pending, 
the developer alleged that someone with a connection to the challengers 
called the developer’s representatives and “inquired whether plaintiffs would 
be willing to lease space at the [proposed] complex to the [challengers].”149  
If these allegations are true, it would provide additional evidence of 
anticompetitive behavior beyond the zoning appeals themselves. 
 
 139  Id. 
 140  Id. at 145. 
 141  Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super at 149. 
 142  Id. 
 143  Id. at 150. 
 144  Id. at 147; About Us, SHOPRITE, http://www.shoprite.com/about-us/ (last visited Dec. 
20, 2018) (conveying that Wakefern is “the merchandising and distribution arm for 
ShopRite.” It is a retailer-owned cooperative owned by the approximately fifty owners of the 
individual ShopRite stores). 
 145  Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super. at 147–48. 
 146  Id. 
 147  Id. at 143. 
 148  Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 180. 
 149  Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super. at 143. 
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Applying the appropriate standard is especially important in light of the 
lower court’s ruling that the challengers’ actions to petition against “the GDP 
[were] protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and [were] not 
objectively baseless.”150  The New Jersey Superior Court noted that the 
motion judge misapplied the standard and provided no support for her 
conclusion that the challengers’ actions were not objectively baseless.151 
The developer brought the anticompetitive allegations of malicious 
abuse of process, tortious interference, and civil conspiracy after it 
successfully defended against the litigation brought by the challengers.152  
Unlike in Hanover Realty, the developer did not bring the case in federal 
court based on antitrust claims, but instead brought the case in state court 
with allegations of these common law tort violations.153  However, the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine also applies to common law tort claims brought in state 
court.154  The court noted the Fourth Circuit’s application of California 
Motor in Waugh Chapel South, LLC. v. United Foods & Commercial 
Workers Union Local 27.155  In this case, the Fourth Circuit held that “the 
subjective motive of the litigant and objective merits of the suit are relevant, 
but other signs of bad-faith litigation . . . may also be probative of abuse of 
the adjudicatory process.”156  In Waugh Chapel South, the court found sham 
litigation “where only one of fourteen proceedings were successful.”157 
C. Malicious Abuse of Process 
Malicious abuse of process is “[t]he improper and tortious use of a 
legitimately issued court process to obtain a result that is either unlawful or 
beyond the process’s scope.”158  The developer must show that the challenger 
“performed further acts after the issuance of process which represents the 
perversion or abuse of the legitimate purposes of that process.”159 
In Woolwich, the developer argued that filing an appeal of the 
developer’s approval and subsequently reaching out to a representative of 
the developer to lease the proposed space may be a sufficient “further act 
 
 150  Id. at 140. 
 151  Id. at 140–41. 
 152  Id. 
 153  Compare Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 170, with Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super. at 143. 
 154  Wooster, supra note 50 at §3 (citing Alfred Weissman Real Estate, Inc. v. Big V 
Supermarkets, Inc., 707 N.Y.S. 2d 647 (App. Div. 2000). 
 155  Waugh Chapel S. LLC v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 27, 728 
F.3d 354, 364 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 156  Id. 
 157  Id. 
 158  Abuse of Process, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 159  Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super. at 151. 
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after the issuance of process.”160  Additionally, the challengers did not 
oppose the zoning approval until they discovered that a ShopRite competitor 
would have been a tenant at the site.161  These two arguments undermined 
the challengers’ claim that they opposed the development “in good faith.”162 
D. Tortious Interference 
Tortious interference claims must “rest on facts plausibly supporting a 
conclusion that defendants’ actions were ‘improper’ or ‘wrongful.’”163  In 
order to determine if either of these conditions are met, the court must 
evaluate “the nature of and motivation behind the conduct, the interests 
advanced and interfered with, societal interests that bear on the rights of each 
party, the proximate relationship between the conduct and interference, and 
the relationship between the parties.”164  Here, in Woolwich, the court again 
looked at the timing of the challenges and noted that no appeals followed the 
original GDP approval.165  However, when it was later discovered that a Wal-
Mart would be occupying the commercial space, the challengers hired a 
lawyer in order to appeal the second GDP approval.166 
This case—whose litigation ran for two and a half years—is another 
example of how zoning petitions can be an effective tool against a competitor 
if left unchecked.167  The developers stated that during the pending litigation 
“they were unable to proceed with the development of [the property], could 
not enter into leases with prospective tenants, and lost ‘credibility in the 
marketplace.’”168 
There is a delicate balance between enacting stricter laws to stop 
anticompetitive zoning challenges and infringing on the First Amendment 
right to petition the government for redress of grievances.  Using a fact-
sensitive, open-ended analysis allowed the Woolwich court to review the fact 
that the challengers had filed numerous similar anticompetitive petitions 
across New Jersey. 
 
 160  Id. 
 161  Id. 
 162  Id. 
 163  Id. at 152 (quoting Nostrame v. Santiago, 213 N.J. 109, 123 (2013)). 
 164  Id. at 152 (quoting Nostrame, 213 N.J. at 122). 
 165  Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super. at 151. 
 166  Id. at 152. 
 167  Id. 
 168  Id. at 152. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. Appropriate Analysis for Reviewing Sham Litigation in Zoning 
In Hanover Realty, the Third Circuit reconciled California Motor and 
Professional Real Estate “by concluding that they apply to different 
situations: California Motor [applies] to a series of sham petitions[,] and 
Professional Real Estate [applies] to a single sham petition.”169  First, the 
court should determine (1) how many filings the challenging party has issued 
against the prospective development, or (2) whether the challengers have 
filed numerous meritless filings.170  “Where there is only one alleged sham 
petition, Professional Real Estate’s exacting two-step test properly [tilts the 
scale] in favor of the defendant.”171  Courts should be wary of limiting First 
Amendment freedom of speech protections when there is only one petition.  
Additionally, “with only one ‘data point,’ it is difficult to determine with any 
precision whether the petition was anticompetitive.”172  However, when it is 
sufficiently alleged that the defendant interfered by filing a pattern of 
baseless appeals against the developer’s project, the more flexible 
application in California Motor should apply.173  In this case, a court “should 
perform a holistic review that may include looking at the defendant’s filing 
status (i.e. win-loss percentage) as well as circumstantial evidence of the 
defendant’s subjective motivations.”174  “Courts should consider evidence of 
bad-faith as well as the magnitude and the nature of the collateral harm 
imposed on the plaintiffs by the defendants’ petitioning activity (i.e. abuses 
of the discovery process and interference with access to governmental 
agencies).”175  Courts must also be careful not to let a defendant’s campaign 
of sham litigation be overlooked just because they have been successful in a 
limited number of challenges.176 
Further, in Woolwich, the New Jersey Superior Court highlighted 
evidence provided by the developer that the challenging party had conducted 
the same or similar anticompetitive actions in other projects.177  When 
determining if the challenger has engaged in a pattern of baseless claims, it 
may be relevant to include the challengers’ alleged sham litigations in other 
locations and not only the number of challenges filed in the case at issue. 
 
 169  Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 179. 
 170  Id. at 180. 
 171  Id. 
 172  Id. 
 173  Id. at 180–81 (stating “a more flexible standard is appropriate when dealing with a 
pattern of petitioning”). 
 174  Id. at 180. 
 175  Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d 162 at 181. 
 176  Id. at 182. 
 177  Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super. 135 at 147–48. 
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B. Standing Requirement 
A just result is not always achieved where an aggrieved party is made 
whole with a counter-suit because a developer may be shut out of court for 
lack of standing.  As the dissent in Hanover Realty discusses, standing often 
keeps the developers from suing the parties who opposed numerous permits 
and presented court challenges delaying their development project.178  There 
is irony in the fact that a party that weathered allegedly baseless judicial and 
administrative challenges is then prevented from appealing to the courts to 
make themselves whole for lost profits from the failed development project.  
It is problematic that the developer lost the development project due to the 
expenses and delay imposed on the project by the challenger, so the 
developer should have a cause of action. 
The standing question is raised for cases in federal court because 
obtaining standing for an antitrust claim requires that the party be “injured 
in his business or property by anything forbidden in antitrust laws.”179  In 
Hanover Realty, the court ruled that the developer had standing to sue 
because its actions were “inextricably intertwined” with the challengers’ 
objectively baseless conduct intended to prohibit access by the prospective 
tenant.180  Defendants may look to bring an antitrust case in federal court 
because they are able to receive treble damages and reimbursement for the 
lawsuit’s costs, including attorney’s fees.181  However, if antitrust standing 
cannot be established in federal court, an alternative is to bring causes of 
action for tortious interference and malicious abuse of process in state 
courts.182 
To combat sham challenges that lead to unfair outcomes for developers 
and overwhelm the court dockets with baseless claims, the more flexible 
standard outlined in Hanover Realty should be applied when there is 
sufficient evidence to allege a pattern of baseless claims by the challenger. 
 
 
 178  Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 187 (Ambro, J., dissenting in part) (citing Southaven Land 
Co. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1983); Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 
F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
 179  15 U.S.C. § 15(a); see also, Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) 
(“The Clayton Act (Act) does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to 
competitors, or to sellers. The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all 
who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.”). 
 180  Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d 162 at 168. 
 181  15 U.S.C. § 15(a). 
 182  See e.g., Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super. at 153. 
